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Technology-Enhanced Learning: a Question of Knowledge 
 
JAN DERRY 
 
This paper is concerned with the human dimension of technology-enhanced 
learning; many suppositions are made about this but the amount of attention it 
has been given relative to that paid to technology is quite limited. It is argued 
that an aspect of the question that deserves more attention than it has received 
in the work on the application of technologies to education is epistemology on 
the grounds that the nature of knowledge and the general character of mind 
are critically important. As regards epistemology this paper draws on recent 
developments in philosophy by John McDowell and Robert Brandom that deal 
with the relation of mind to world and the nature of experience. From 
McDowell it draws on the idea of second nature and particularly the argument 
that human beings acquire their cognitive capacities by initiation into 
language and tradition. From Brandom it draws on the idea that humans 
stand apart from animals and machines in that they respond to reasons as well 
as to causes. It is argued that the implication of these ideas for education 
differ radically from the pedagogic models that underpin much work on 
technology-enhanced learning where the suppositions about experience are 
quite different. Indeed the nature of knowledge is usually presumed rather 
than examined and often what is taken for granted is awareness as a 
conceptually unmediated response to the world. These questions are raised in 
the context of so far disappointing results of the use of technologies to 
enhance learning. 
 
 
Philosophy is set at a distance from concrete questions such as how technologies can 
be used to enhance learning. Nevertheless there is a significant if not immediate 
contribution that philosophy can make to technology-enhanced learning. It is widely 
recognised, for example, that presuppositions involving models of mind and theories 
of learning underpin attempts to integrate technologies into processes of learning. 
These presuppositions are also significant in questions concerning the enhancement of 
learning as they have implications for how technology is designed and applied. It is by 
making these presuppositions explicit that philosophy can work as an under-labourer, 
conceptualising attempts to utilise the power of technologies for learning. However, 
there is a further and more significant aspect to the work that philosophy can do as it 
happens that there is a coincidence of pedagogic and philosophic concerns centred on 
the unique characteristics of the human mind. We owe our distinctive cognitive 
powers to cumulative cultural evolution (Tomasello, 1999; Bakhurst, 2005), and thus 
philosophical investigations into the nature of mind and of knowing impinge directly 
on the question of the development of mind. This question is complicated since the 
environment in which the human mind develops has a history itself; and this history 
owes its form to the activities of human beings, which are in turn conditioned by the 
development of mind. In the light of this one can speak of human beings as both 
having and inhabiting a second nature. This, it is argued here, has implications for 
epistemology and through epistemology for learning. It is this connection between 
philosophy and education, and specifically the application of technologies to 
education, that is traced here. 
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I 
 
The use of digital technologies in education has so far not fulfilled expectations. Why 
is this so? Is it the intransigence of teachers? The constraints of schools? Or problems 
with the hardware and software? These factors are all too often blamed for the failure, 
and although possibly all bear some responsibility what will be considered here are 
other issues of an epistemological nature that require philosophical analysis. 
‘Technology-enhanced learning’ (TEL) is a sweeping phrase encompassing an 
eclectic range of adaptations and usage, and therefore any philosophical points 
brought to bear run the risk of vagueness. In what follows I shall then set up a 
necessarily simplified characterisation but one that captures many of the assumptions 
informing practice, even though it may appear at first sight far removed from the 
issues involved.  
 
In addition to the catch-all nature of the phrase ‘technology-enhanced learning’, the 
policy initiatives bringing technologies into education, particularly into mainstream 
schooling, are in a state of flux. The history of these initiatives shows a change in the 
focus of attention from an early emphasis on the technology itself towards a greater 
concern with the details of learning and the learner. In Europe this is illustrated by the 
recent adoption of the expression ‘technology-enhanced learning’ in place of 
‘information technologies’ - or, in the case of the UK, ‘information communication 
technologies’. Setting aside the natural emphasis on technologies as such, serious 
questions can be raised about the way and form in which the human element involved 
has been recognised. The importance of the primacy of the human element turns out 
to be much broader than at first appears, for what it involves is nothing less that a 
recognition of the distinctive quality of human contact with the world. One 
particularly significant aspect of the ongoing philosophical debate on this subject is 
the extent to which this human contact with the world is social. 
 
This limited attention given to the role of teachers, in comparison to the volume of 
research placing emphasis on the technology itself, is understandable. In a period 
where technology is viewed as educationally indispensable, the authority of the 
teacher has been questioned, and learners are believed to ‘create knowledge’. Against 
this background it is unsurprising that both policy and research agendas have grown 
around the issue of how technologies can advance learning, while problems of 
pedagogy and the acquisition of knowledge, which technologies are intended to 
resolve, have been neglected. Given the widespread and varied reference to 
‘pedagogy’ in research on technology-enhanced learning, it may appear inappropriate 
to suggest the issue is neglected. But it is argued here that the pedagogical aspect 
central to any use of new technologies in education requires much closer examination 
than it is receiving, and that the unexamined pedagogic presuppositions informing use 
require spelling out.  
  
So far the project to integrate technologies into education does not have a common 
research programme. The drive to integrate technologies into education carried all 
before it. In the rush to achieve results too much has been taken for granted about the 
way in which students learn. For instance, questions such as that of the social nature 
of mind have received little attention; and this is so because the pressure to speed up 
the utilisation of digital technologies has dictated the course of events, even though 
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the human side of the equation is as crucial as the technical specification of 
technologies - arguably it is far more crucial. 
 
The question of teacher autonomy is another matter requiring careful consideration in 
this context. Autonomy here means more than the freedom of teachers to exercise 
their judgment over curricula and pedagogic approaches since it extends to questions 
about the conditions necessary for the development of teachers as educators in the 
first place. In practice computers have been introduced into classrooms without taking 
such matters into account. In a recent Department for Education and Skills policy 
document, Harnessing Technology , government policy appears to give priority to the 
learners: ‘‘we aim to put learners, young people – and their parents - in the driving 
seat, shaping the opportunities open to all learners to fit around their needs and 
preferences’ (Department for Education and Skills, 2005); but, although referred to, 
the issues concerning pedagogy and knowledge are at no point spelt out. Expressions 
like ‘Technology can be mobile. That means e-learning can come to the learner’ 
reveal unexamined suppositions that are still being made. They run as follows: There 
is such a thing as e-learning that exists in its own right. It can be brought to learners, 
just as water can be brought down irrigation channels to parched fields. Given the 
rhetoric that is bound to appear in a widely distributed policy document, it is no 
surprise that technology is presented as a panacea. The value of greater access to 
information is not a matter of dispute, but information and knowledge are not the 
same thing, and the availability of the one does not itself foster the growth of the 
other. Education involves far more than the acquisition of information and the ability 
to follow procedures. It also includes the development of capacities of judgment - that 
is, the capacity not merely to respond passively to events but to make decisions 
actively in different contexts; and it is here that the distinctive nature of our contact 
with the world - the distinction between human knowing and mechanical 
responsiveness – is significant. 
 
II 
 
Philosophy, in particular, has something to offer when questions about knowledge and 
knowing are central. The discussion of embodied, distributed and situated cognition, 
and the rise of the learning sciences that have been precipitated in part by the 
experience of introducing technologies into education, have posed questions about the 
nature of mind. What is argued in this paper is that the ideas about mind and world 
that have been developed by John McDowell and Robert Brandom are relevant to 
education even though they have not been applied by them in this area. There are 
three reasons for claiming their relevance: first, that their concern with the nature of 
knowledge has critical implications for pedagogy; second, that they offer a thorough 
critique of the conception of experience that by default informs much of the 
technological work in the area; and third, that they open questions often foreclosed 
about the distinctive nature of human thought. 
 
It has been noted that ‘computers have generally failed teachers and students’ and that 
‘computers only benefit learning when they take into account what we know about 
how children learn, and when they are designed to be closely integrated with teacher 
and student interactions in the classroom’ (Sawyer, 2006, p. xii). This goes some way 
towards accounting for the disappointing results of investing in computers in schools 
(Cuban, 2001). For instance, when some years ago Seymour Papert advocated the 
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replacement of conventional classrooms with computers, it was not his intention to 
give the teacher a significant role (Papert, 1980). The contrast between 
‘instructionism’ and ‘constructionism’ has been at the heart of the attempts to use 
technologies to lever traditional classrooms with poor practices into more active and 
inclusive learning environments. Difficulties arise from the fact that instructionism is 
contrasted unfavourably with the more ‘active’ practices integral to constructivist 
approaches. For instructionism is characterised in terms of its tendency ‘to overvalue 
abstract reasoning’, understood in terms of the isolation of ‘pure essential factors from 
the details of concrete reality’ and then attempting to pass these on (Papert, 1993). 
However, the target here is really the poor teaching practices that treat knowledge as 
though it were simply a collection of facts and procedures to be conveyed ready-
made. But, as these ideas have become generalised beyond specific examples, the idea 
of knowledge as authority has also been included in the target. 
 
The growth of the Internet has come at a time when the status of knowledge and the 
integrity of knowledge domains are being called into question. In place of 
authoritative sources of knowledge, the internet, by providing large quantities of 
information in a non-authoritative fashion, appears to offer learners the possibility of 
constructing their own meanings based on their own interests and experiences. Much 
of the discourse on technologies in education emphasises interactivity, the 
possibilities for scaffolding learning and the constructive potential for learners to 
‘make their own meaning’. However, in the case of interactivity, for example, its 
human side is often not made explicit. What is downplayed is the nature of knowledge 
and the specific character of knowledge domains. In part the downplaying is a result 
of the general disenchantment with truth and knowledge as revelation. This idea of 
knowledge as something to be revealed is forcefully criticised by Richard Rorty 
(1981) in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, where he targets the correspondence 
view of truth, understood in terms of representations mapped on to objects. The wide 
disenchantment with such a conception of truth and the apparent disintegration of 
institutional structures that played a pivotal role in the development of knowledge 
coincided with the growth of a more popular belief that knowledge was a matter of 
personal construction. But this occurred without a proper regard to the domain within 
which this construction takes place. As a result, precise questions about knowledge 
have been pushed to the background, and attention has shifted to the contribution of 
computers - such as the possibilities they offer for interactivity, scaffolding and 
dialogue. Even though recent work has concentrated on more detailed questions of 
learning and pedagogy, the question of knowledge has been neglected. Consequently 
the weight being attached to the significance of the technology has not been 
adequately interrogated. 
 
The focus on the learner, without adequate consideration of the nature of the 
knowledge domain, relies in part on the variety of epistemological assumptions 
underpinning the popularised idea of learners as constructors. In what Jerome Bruner 
called ‘a policy document in our times’ (Bruner, 1996, p. 33), Robert Reich captures 
the idea of learners as constructors of meaning when he speaks of the need for 
education to produce ‘symbolic analysts’, namely learners active in the 
conceptualisation of the knowledge. His claim in part rests on the idea that we are 
now part of the ‘knowledge age’ where ‘data . . . will be available . . . at the touch of a 
computer key’ (Reich, 1992, p. 229). Reich uses the contemporary discourse closely 
associated with new technologies to make a case for the importance of recognising 
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that the specific powers of transformation and synthesis possessed by the ‘symbolic 
analyst’ are critical. The counterpart to this idea of the analyst ( here a version of 
constructivism in Reich’s thought become apparent) is the concept of the world as 
devoid of meaning, bearing no particular truth apart from that arising from those 
constructive interventions imposed on it by humans. Reich writes: ‘Consider first the 
capacity for abstraction. The real world is nothing but a vast jumble of noises, shapes, 
colours, smells and textures - essentially meaningless until the human mind imposes 
some order on them’ (ibid.). When he writes this, he is giving expression to a dualist 
default position, common in contemporary thinking, including thinking about 
technologies in education. 
It is precisely this dualism that McDowell takes to task. Once this view of the 
world is adopted responsibility for meaning is dependent entirely on human 
construction. The argument here is that this epistemological view goes along with 
neglect of the fact that at every point in time there is always a body or domain of 
knowledge about the world already in existence even if it is rejected by later 
generations as inadequate. Once the existence of these domains of knowledge, 
embodied in social practices and language, is recognised, questions concerning 
induction into them come to the fore. By implication, if they are not recognised, these 
questions have no grounds and thus appear pointless. At stake here is the account of 
experience that is presupposed.  
Two world views can be counterposed at this point. One can be called 
Humean, a view that envisions a world of determining individuals acting on their 
desires and that prefigures the modern image of learners as consumers acquiring 
knowledge from the internet in much the same way as they might shoes from an 
online shoe store. (Katz et al., 1999, p. 54). The other might be termed ‘Aristotelian’. 
It emphasises virtues of acquiring knowledge and dispositions by pursuing a 
discipline, where knowledge is acquired by discipline. On this view, the process of 
acquiring knowledge is as valuable as the knowledge by which it is acquired, as it 
instils in the learner a way of being in the world and acquiring what Aristotle means 
by virtue.  
An alternative to the epistemological conception underlying the former position, 
which was originally inspired by Locke and then Hume, is McDowell’s account of 
experience, which has roots in Aristotle, Hegel and Wittgenstein. This account starts 
by exorcising the anxieties of contemporary philosophy about how thought can be in 
touch with the world at all. Although it returns us to the position that we take for 
granted as it unfolds – that is to say, insisting that our thought is in contact with the 
world from the start, the route it takes to reach this position has fundamental 
importance for the educationalist, namely that we are not born human but become 
human in the course of maturity, not by virtue of some realisation of biologically 
given capacities but socially and culturally by induction into language and tradition 
(Bildung). This concept of human development, where the relation between cognition 
and the world is different from that envisaged in traditional empiricism, has 
consequences - in particular, that our contact with the world and thereby that growth 
in our knowledge can only take place as a moment in a more generalised process of 
development. This development is not simply due to maturation since this can take 
place only though initiation into an already humanised world, a process that actualises 
our second nature. The significance of McDowell’s argument is that he resolves the 
quandary about how thought can get a grip on the world where there is an oscillation 
between two alternative positions – between a ‘coherentism that renounces external 
constraints on thinking’ and ‘a vain appeal to the Given, in the sense of bare presences 
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that are supposed to be the ultimate grounds of empirical judgements’ (McDowell, 
1996, p.24). But in unpacking what is presupposed in both positions - and this is 
where the force of his argument lies - McDowell shifts attention from what it is 
mistakenly assumed that we share with animals, to what it is that is distinctive about 
human beings. This is our responsiveness to reasons - which McDowell calls ‘a good 
gloss on one notion of freedom’(p. xxiii). By shifting the focus to second nature in 
this way McDowell gives priority to the development of our cognitive capacities by 
initiation into language and tradition. In initiation far more is involved than simply the 
acquisition of the means for communication, since initiation into language is nothing 
less than initiation into the social practices that constitute meaning and establish the 
conditions within which reasons can be demanded and given. Through initiation into a 
language children are brought into ‘a store of historically accumulated wisdom about 
what is a reason for what’, and they thereby acquire ‘the capacity to think and act’ (p. 
126). 
 
 The account of Bildung as McDowell sees it may appear esoteric, but since it is 
relevant to the question of how children make generations of activity in the world 
their own it has obvious implications for education. McDowell has not explored these 
implications, and possibly this has left his own project incomplete and under-
developed (Testa, I. 2007). Cognitive capacities (or what may be called the 
‘intellectual virtues’) are developed through the induction of the child into culture, 
tradition and so on. These capacities are distinctively human, and it is their 
distinctiveness that is not taken into account in the epistemological positions that 
McDowell interrogates. In describing a ‘kind of predicament that we tend to fall into 
when we think about aspects of the human condition’, he reminds us that ‘we tend to 
be forgetful of the very idea of second nature’ (McDowell, 1996, p.85). It is claimed 
here that the work of bringing technology into education, is premised on this same 
epistemological forgetfulness, which makes proper recognition of the distinctive 
qualities of the human mind impossible. What makes McDowell’s work important in 
this connection is that the epistemological assumptions involved in the positions he 
criticises inform much contemporary thinking about the application of technology to 
education. 
 
 
III 
 
At the heart of the dualist conception that informs so much of thinking about the use 
of technologies in education is a conception of experience relying upon what Wilfred 
Sellars called the Myth of the Given. The idea of the Given is the idea that we have 
immediate awareness of the world from the very start, without either language or 
reason, and that knowledge results from impressions that, having impinged on our 
senses, are interpreted by human construction. According to this view of things, 
concepts come into play late in the day after the world has already, so to speak, been 
taken in. Coupled to this idea of the Given is awareness understood in representational 
terms. This common sense way of thinking about meaning involves understanding 
signs or representations as having meaning solely by virtue of the objects they 
designate. In this commonsense approach accompanying constructivism in many 
writings on technology, although not obviously consistent with it, objects are believed 
to be the sole source of meaning, a meaning that is then conveyed to the receptor 
through their sign or representation. This approach is plausible in certain circumstance 
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- for example, where animal predators see spiky features as unpalatable and respond 
automatically to them by backing off pursuit of the prey. But are human responses 
equally automatic in responding to the objects they come across? If so, then we might 
be correct in assuming that human beings learn in ways not very different from other 
forms of life. However, as soon as we consider the human infant, it becomes clear that 
it is responding in an environment where the significance that conditions its response, 
and thereby its contact with the world, is, in the first place, mediated by other human 
beings (i.e. it is being initiated into second nature). What is problematic in the picture 
of the animal and its environment is the idea that the stimulus to which the response is 
made inheres in the object or representation of the object (i.e. it is a Given). However 
in the case of the human infant, rather than the event or object being the sole source of 
the response, it is the parent or other significant actors who provide the active 
conditions that are decisive in giving meaning for the child’s early responses. 
Vygotsky (1987) captured this process in his concept of a zone of proximal 
development. Meaning is attributed to the child’s utterances and physical movements, 
and it is to this meaning that the parents respond, regardless of any intention on the 
part of the child to communicate meaning in the first place. In this sense, meaning is a 
product of a social process, and its significance relies on other actors and their 
relationships to each other and the world. This is what Vygotsky meant when he 
argued that what was first external and directed towards others is then exercised on 
oneself inwardly. This in turn accounts for the shift from external to internal 
development of the higher capacities of mind. For the use of a word, or the carrying 
out of an activity before fully understanding the meaning or significance of that 
activity, is a precursor through inner-directedness of understanding its significance. It 
might seem that the educational requirements of a social theory of mind must then be 
satisfied by a transition from classrooms where learners are only drilled in ‘facts’ to 
one where they manipulate, investigate, discuss and construct. But if this transition is 
effected simply by introducing technology into a classroom that itself remains 
unchanged (i.e. without consideration to human conditions and historically 
accumulated practices in knowledge domains), little if anything is likely to be 
achieved. In fact, it is possible that things will simply get worse. 
 
Like McDowell, Robert Brandom (1994) also draws on Wilfred Sellars’ critique of 
this concept of the Given, and he similarly takes issue with the idea of immediacy of 
awareness and its attendant conception of our relation to the world. Sellars’ critique 
involves an attack not just on the idea of impressions as data, but on the entire 
‘framework of givenness’ or what Hegel would call immediacy (Sellars, 1997) - that 
is, on the idea that our relation to the world is one of direct awareness. This may seem 
identical to common versions of the constructivist approach - that is, that what we see 
is dependent on our construction of it and not given to us by data. But what is really at 
stake here is not construction as such but the way this construction is effected: the 
question is at what point concepts enter the picture and how these concepts are 
acquired. Whereas the picture of mind and world that appears to inform Reich’s view 
sees construction as arising from the ability of the analyst to construct meaning out of 
raw data, the alternative view, associated with Sellars, McDowell and Brandom, sees 
construction as originating through induction into what Sellars calls the space of 
reasons. It may be useful to point out that, in this context, the space of reasons 
contains both objects as well as subjects; it contains mind as well as world. The 
process that, on the one side, establishes humans in terms of second nature has its 
corollary, on the other, in the constitution of the world as data.  
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Contrary to the idea of immediate awareness of the world as data impinging on our 
senses, Sellars’ states in his attack on the myth of the given: ‘In characterising an 
episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving a . . . description of that 
episode or state; we are placing it in the . . . space of reasons, of justifying and being 
able to justify what one says’ (Sellars, 1996, p. 76). Responsiveness to the world does 
not start with our causal relation with raw data. It is immediately social in virtue of the 
development of our second nature, and this involves the actualisation of our cognitive 
capacities. So rather than our responses comprising merely causal relations with our 
environment, they take place, from the very start, within the space of reasons. This 
has consequences for how we think about the nature of experience since, according to 
McDowell, a normative context is necessary for being in touch with the world at all, 
whether knowledgeably or not.  
 
In alerting us to the fact that knowing is not something that can arise by direct 
(unmediated) contact with the world, that it involves not just concepts but concepts in 
systematic relation to one another, Sellars introduces the Kantian conception of 
representation, a conception where judgments play an integral role. Our contact with 
the world as human beings with a second nature entails that our responses are 
governed by reasons as well as causes. In other words our responses are essentially 
normative in the sense that they depend upon the significance that human activities 
have given to objects, phenomena and events in the course of their activity in the 
world. Since Descartes and the development of modern science, epistemology has 
relied on a representational paradigm in which experience is understood in terms of 
perceiving minds making sense of a brute Given - what McDowell, 1996, calls a 
disenchanted world. This epistemological picture results in the problem of the nature 
of our contact with the world, a problem that has pre-occupied modern philosophy 
and that McDowell sets out to address. Without understanding that experience is 
already conceptual, we are left with an anxiety about how thoughts can be in touch 
with the world at all. The argument that experience is already conceptual goes against 
our common-sense intuition, yet these developments in philosophy provide rich 
resources for understanding the issues raised by the use of technologies to enhance 
learning. 
 
The Cartesian epistemological picture criticised here forms a background to 
educational thought, including those relativistic forms of constructivism that argue 
that there is no way of ruling between one position and another and no convincing 
grounds for seeing progress in science or exercising any criteria of truth (Gergen, 
1999). More importantly, it has led to a neglect of the question of knowledge and of 
the full extent of what is involved in bringing a learner into a knowledge domain. For 
philosophy it has led to an oscillation between a thorough-going coherentism – the 
position that only beliefs can justify beliefs, which takes away external constraints on 
our thinking - and the counter position where the external constraints on thinking are 
seen as absolute. Neither position provides a satisfying account of the relations of 
mind to world: each misses the active, productive character of our contact with the 
world; that is, each misinterprets experience as being outside of thought rather than 
containing thought itself, indeed as intricately entwined with the very possibility and 
constitution of thought.  
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McDowell’s exorcism of the Cartesian picture results in an account of experience as 
already conceptual. Humans inhabit not nature but second nature, and they are not 
subject to this in the way that animals are subject to nature. The world of second 
nature is already infused with meaning as a result of the practices and modifications 
of nature through which it has been brought about. McDowell’s argument that human 
beings are ‘born mere animals and they are transformed into thinkers and intentional 
agents in the course of coming to maturity’ (McDowell, 1996, p. 125) has great 
significance for how we think about learning. Thought connects with reality only 
because to be a thinker is to inhabit the space of reasons, and powers of thought 
develop by being initiated into a language, into the ‘putatively rational linkages that 
constitute the space of reasons’ (p. 186). This idea that experience is already 
conceptual is very different from any view that takes humans to be constructing 
meaning out of raw data.  
 
And yet the idea that human beings do construct meaning out of raw data still forms 
the background to much educational thought. Hence, insufficient attention is given to 
the interrelation of knowledge and learning - or, to put it another way, to the 
importance of epistemology for education. The philosophical innovations touched on 
here draw a different line between mind and world, or in McDowell’s terms between 
reason and nature, than that drawn in the Cartesian picture. In this alternative to what 
McDowell calls ‘bald naturalism’, nature includes second nature since human 
thoughts are as much a part of nature as the activities of animals. In this respect the 
modification of nature, which this capacity to think has made possible, also counts as 
natural. Drawing the line between mind and world differently, this view places far 
greater weight not just on knowledge and its constitution but on the activity of coming 
to know.  
 
If we accept the idea that when we respond to an environment, we do so within a 
space of reasons, we can appreciate what distinguishes human knowing from animal 
or mechanical responsiveness. Brandom (2000) illustrates this idea with a simple 
example when he asks us to consider what distinguishes human responsiveness from 
that of a machine or animal. He takes an example of the contrast between a fire alarm 
and a human being shouting the warning ‘Fire!’ Fire alarms may well respond more 
effectively and reliably to the stimuli of fire than the human being. Their sensors are 
probably more sensitive than human organs, the sounds they make more compelling 
of attention. But Brandom asks us to contrast a child shouting ‘Fire’ with the 
mechanical alarm and consider what initiates the response. With the alarm the 
response is the end point of a causal chain in which smoke hits sensors and activates a 
process resulting in a siren sound. However, for the child reasons are involved from 
the very start, even if initially only as background to her response, before she becomes 
fully aware of them. Unlike an alarm, which responds mechanically to temperature 
and smoke, etc., the child has a concept of fire and therefore an appreciation of its 
consequences, though this appreciation may be limited and developing. In other words 
the response of the child is not a reflex. Even though it may be automatic and in this 
sense not entail conscious thought, it nonetheless involves responsiveness to reasons; 
that is, it involves thought. This the machine lacks. For the child the fire is the reason 
for the alarm and not merely the cause, because the child perceives the fire as fire; 
unlike a machine, the child has a concept of fire as part of a system of concepts. For 
Brandom, making a report as a human being is not ‘responding differentially’ since it 
involves inferring rather than merely representing. Brandom’s argument rests on a 
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critique of the dominant representational paradigm and on the claim that, insofar as 
human contact with the world is concerned, we need to privilege inference over 
representation; our awareness should not be understood primarily in representational 
terms but in terms of the inferential space that we inhabit as thinking creatures. 
Awareness of any one concept is dependent on awareness of a range of other concepts 
that constitute its meaning in the first place.  
 
This distinction that Brandom draws between reacting differentially and responding to 
reasons, a distinction already drawn in German idealist thought at the end of the 
eighteenth century, has a contribution to make to the problems that arise with the 
application of technology to education. For, once the idea of immediacy is rejected 
and it is recognised that the awareness of human beings operates within a space of 
reasons, it is clearly the task for educators not only to provide learners with rich data 
from which they can construct meanings but also to move them from the space of 
reason within which they start to that of the knowledge domain they are studying. The 
knowledge to which learners qua learners are introduced is different from the 
knowledge that arises from everyday experience. Education as the means by which 
hard-won knowledge is passed from one generation to the next involves practices and 
objects that are not the content of everyday lives, however important they may be for 
it. The knowledge with which education is concerned cannot be acquired without 
conscious and purposeful involvement by both teachers and learners regardless of the 
setting (Young, 2008).  
 As far as pedagogy is concerned, the priority of inference over reference 
means that the grasping of a concept involves the learner’s committing to the 
inferences implicit in its use in social practices of giving and asking for reasons. 
Effective teaching involves providing the opportunity for learners to operate with a 
concept in the space of reasons within which it falls and through which its meaning is 
constituted. Participation in such a space does not require an immediate and full grasp 
of the concept from the start, but rather only the ability to inhabit the space in which 
reasons constituting the concept operate. 
 
 
 
IV 
 
Technology offers the possibility of engaging with the world before fully knowing it 
(Noss  and Hoyles, 1996); it enables us to gain access to inferential relations between 
concepts before fully acquiring the concepts involved. Digital technologies make it 
possible to bring changes in the relationships between concepts and hence their 
meanings into plain view. However, this requires not only a high level of pedagogic 
design but also active participation by both teacher and learners. It is not the concepts 
themselves and their referents that are the object of learning, but their meaning as 
governed by their systemic relation to one another. Through being inducted into the 
inferential relations between concepts, learners begin to understand what it is to do 
mathematics and history and so on. Giving inference priority over representation 
means that pedagogic design must focus not on individual concepts but on the 
knowledge domains that constitute them. This is a more exacting task for design than 
dealing with concepts alone. This pedagogic strategy that recognises inferential 
systems requires much more time and effort than the more common approach that 
treats concepts as representations.  
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An example of the way in which a technology facilitates the use of concepts before 
they are fully grasped is the programming language Logo. This, as is widely known, 
allows children to explore mathematical relations concretely before they have any 
idea of what explains them in abstract terms. But while a technology like Logo can 
make visible the inferential relations that constitute concepts, as for instance when the 
making of a triangle reveals the specifications of the figure, the advantages of this will 
only be properly realised when the technology is used as an element in a programme 
in which priority is given to knowledge domains. To make it work effectively not only 
do teachers need to be there when they guide the learner, but they need to have a clear 
understanding of the priority of the particular knowledge domain in mind. However, 
the lack of recognition of what is involved in teaching, in terms of the development of 
cognitive capacities, has meant that the time and resources required by such a way of 
teaching are well beyond what is available for teachers preparing for lessons in most 
contemporary classrooms. 
 
The application of technology without adequate attention to the knowledge domain 
runs into problems that can be traced back to the way that learning is based on the 
weak and narrow conception of experience criticised here. Certainly it is true that, as 
far as the application of technology to education is concerned, it is generally 
recognised that the exposure of learners to rich information is insufficient by itself. 
But there is far from full agreement about what steps are needed to augment it. In this 
connection the argument made by Nicolas Balacheff, who acted as scientific manager 
for the Kaleidoscope European research network on technology enhanced learning, is 
particularly relevant.  
 
A concentration on learning with little or no attention paid to the question of 
knowledge as such is criticised by Balacheff, who argues for ‘design supported by a 
deep epistemological analysis of the domain considered’ (Balacheff, 2004). Noting 
that the project to bring technologies into education started with the push of 
technology and only later, at the close of the twentieth century, turned to the learner-
driven principle of design, Balacheff argues that the project will not be soundly based 
until knowledge is placed at the centre of learning: ‘The agreement we might reach on 
a ‘learning driven’ principle of design of technology enhanced learning (TEL) 
environments would in the end prove as disappointing as the naïve and initial focus on 
technology per se and the subsequent reaction by the focus on the learner’ (ibid.).  He 
goes on to argue that the term learning has no meaning unless it is concerned with 
knowledge. In other words focus on the learners without recognition of knowledge 
domains offers no way forward:  ‘After sixty years of research . . . in the field of TEL 
we are sent back to the understanding of knowledge[, and] that understanding 
knowledge is a strategic condition for the development of TEL from a theoretical as 
well as from an operational perspective’ (ibid.). 
 
There is then what appears to be a mundane but is in fact the central, on-going 
problem in the classroom: how those learners who are least engaged in contemporary 
classrooms can become engaged by the use of technology. Even where learners are 
motivated, their orientation towards what it is that they are to make sense of cannot 
necessarily be assumed to be adequate (Arnseth and Säljö, 2007). To underline this 
argument, it must be stated that adequacy is not the serial learning of concepts on a 
scale of growing complexity, what is required is entry into a knowledge domain, with 
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all that is implied by this. Moreover the approach must vary from domain to domain, 
for as Balacheff points out: 
 
The characteristics of the milieu for the learning of mathematics, of surgery or 
of foreign languages are fundamentally different. . . [O]ne may say that the 
milieu for surgery is part of the ‘material world’ (here, the human body), for 
foreign languages it includes human beings, for mathematics already a 
theoretical system. Although these observations seem obvious most of the ICT 
projects claim they contribute to TEL research at a general level and they 
pretend to be domain independent (ibid.). 
 
Recognising the provocative nature of what he is saying, he continues ‘A devil’s 
advocate may say that ICT research does not see itself being accountable beyond the 
coherency and robustness of the software it produces, not to mention the constraint of 
re-usability often mentioned to justify the search or claim for domain independence’ 
(ibid.). In fact, it is possible that the proper design of technology-enhanced learning 
environments is an even more complicated matter than Balacheff believes since not 
only do knowledge domains vary as regards content but so also do conceptual 
frameworks and what counts as a reason for what. In fact matters are even more 
complicated when one moves from the sciences and mathematics to the humanities 
and the arts. 
 
If Balacheff’s claim about knowledge were taken seriously, many of the projects to 
implement technology-enhanced learning would have to be radically restructured. For 
the conclusion to which his work points would demand a turning of attention away 
from the technology to the knowledge domain, from here to questions of pedagogy 
and from there one step further, back to epistemology. 
 
Correspondence: Jan Derry, Philosophy Section and London Knowledge Lab, 
Institute of Education, University of London, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL, 
UK. E-mail: j.derry@ioe.ac.uk. 
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